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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was entered on July 29, 2004,
and is attached hereto in the addendum. Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a)
confers sole jurisdiction upon this Court to review decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals. Initially, the Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by
an order dated October 4, 2002. (R. at 474.) Prior to the transfer, Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) conferred jurisdiction on this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the reservation of the easement in this case was sufficiently
specific to be enforceable, and whether the easement may be deemed a floating or
roving easement.
Standard of Review:

Whether an easement exists is a question of law,

reviewed for correctness. "However, the existence of an easement is also a highly
fact-dependent question; therefore, we accord the trial judge a measure of
discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the facts, and overturn a
ruling concerning the existence of an easement only if the judge exceeded the
discretion granted." Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, II1, 37 P.3d 1112.
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or other rules

1

controlling the issue presented in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from a dispute involving a reservation included in a
quitclaim deed between a landowner and Utah County ("County"). The R.L. Bird
Company ("Bird") owned property in Utah County within and to the south and
east of a recorded subdivision known as the Ironton Plat. (R. at 277, 279, 330,
339, 343-44, 415-16, 420-21; Addendum at A47.)

When Bird quitclaimed

property to the County within the Ironton Plat, plus a 120-foot-by-760-foot strip
("Strip") immediately to the south1, it included the following language in the deed:
RESERVING to the grantor [(Bird)] the public use and right-of-way
over and into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide
right-of-way over and across the last described parcel of land [(the
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with the grantor's remaining
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road
within 90 days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to
grantor's remaining land.
(R. at 214, 216, 218, 241, 256-57, 278-79, 342-43, 420-21; Addendum at A46.)
At the time, the Ironton Plat was bounded by Pine Street on the south and
Highway 89 (the "State Highway" mentioned in the reservation) on the west. (R.

1

These dimensions equate to 91,200 square feet, or 2.09 acres.

2

at 218, 279, 420-21; Addendum at A472.) Pine Street, however, existed only on
the plat map. It had neither been opened nor used since its dedication over sixty
years before. (R. at 218, 238-39, 275, 277-78, 341-42, 417-20, 476/45 & /46.)
The County never built the road mentioned in the reservation, but instead
constructed public works buildings and a parking lot in the Ironton Plat over the
locations of Pine Street and other dedicated but unopened streets within the
subdivision. During construction, approximately two-thirds of the western portion
of Pine Street was excavated to flatten the slope of the area. (R. at 208, 277, 31012, 476/10-/12; Addendum at A48-A50.) No evidence has been presented that
Bird, which had access to its remaining property off of Highway 89 further south,
ever sought enjoin the County from excavating the Pine Street area or to build the
road mentioned in the reservation. (R. at 390, 476/11-/12, 476/62.)
Later, Bird sold its remaining property to plaintiff/appellee Jamie Evans,
subsequently conveying the reserved easement via a corrective deed. (R. at 22829, 274, 277, 298-300, 336, 339,410-11,415-16.)
After the County vacated certain platted but unimproved roads within the
Ironton Plat not at issue here, Evans sued, seeking, inter alia, a declaration

2

The map included in the Addendum illustrates the properties and boundaries at
issue: Pine Street is highlighted in blue, the Strip in green, Highway 89 appears as
a pair of dashed lines, and Bird's remaining property is filled with red diagonal
lines. (Addendum at A47.)
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validating the reserved easement. (R. at 13-14, 275-76, 279-80, 337-39, 411-15,
422-23.)
The Course of Proceedings
On the County's motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed
Evans's suit. The court held that Evans's reservation failed for several reasons,
one of which is presented here for the Court's consideration: The district court
ruled that the reservation language was impermissibly vague because it failed to
identify the location and boundaries of the easement. (Addendum at A27-A28,
A42-A43.)
Evans appealed, and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the
case to the district court to develop the record to determine whether Evans had a
right to reserve (or except) an easement over Pine Street. See Evans v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 2004 UT App 256, 1125-27, 97 P.3d 697. This Court then
granted the County's petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue presented here.
Should the Court reverse the court of appeals's holding on this issue, remand will
be unnecessary.
Disposition Below
On the issue presented to this Court for review, the court of appeals held

Although the reservation was originally Bird's, because Evans now owns it (if it
exists), the County herein refers to it as "Evans's reservation" or "Evans's
easement."
4

that Evans's reservation was "sufficiently detailed to create an enforceable
easement." Id. at ^14. According to the court of appeals, the "clear and detailed
language" of Evans's easement identifying its purpose and the servient and
dominant estates was sufficient.

Id. at \\5.

The court also characterized the

easement as floating or roving, and held that the trial court could fix its location
using any of the factors listed in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc.
("Walker"), 253 R2d 365 (Utah 1953). See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, <H16-22, 97
P.3d 697.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL
1.

The R.L. Bird Company owned property in Utah County within and to the

south and east of a subdivision known as the Ironton Plat, recorded in 1926. (R. at
277, 279, 330, 339, 343-44,415-16, 420-21; Addendum at A47.)
2.

In 1983, Bird conveyed to the County by quitclaim deed property within the

Ironton Plat, as well as the Strip. The deed contained the following language:
RESERVING to the grantor [(Bird)] the public use and right-of-way
over and into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide
right-of-way over and across the last described parcel of land [(the
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with the grantor's remaining
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road
within 90 days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to
grantor's remaining land.
(R. at 214, 216, 218, 241, 256-57, 278-79, 342-43,420-21; Addendum at A46.)
3.

Bird later sold its remaining property to Evans, including the easement. (R.
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at 228-29, 274, 277, 298-300, 336, 339, 410-11, 415-16.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah courts interpret reservations of easements using contract law
principles.

Essential terms include the easement's boundaries and location.

Because Evans's easement fails to sufficiently specify its boundaries and location,
it is void. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied these standards in Potter v.
Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, a substantially similar case, to find the
reservation at issue there void. Its decision below represents an unwarranted
departure from that precedent.
Consistent with these same principles of construction, parties' failure to
sufficiently specify an easement's boundaries or location does not transform an
otherwise invalid easement into a valid floating or roving easement. Roating or
roving easements, rather, are a special category of easements that define their
unpredictable boundaries and locations using methods specified by the parties.
ARGUMENT
I.

BIRD'S RESERVED EASEMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT DOES NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFY ITS BOUNDARIES OR LOCATION.
Evan's reservation consists of two parts:

(1) a right of way from the

highway into Pine Street, and (2) a fifty-six-foot-wide right of way crossing the
Strip from Pine Street to Bird's remaining property. (Stmt, of Facts f2.)
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This

latter portion of the reservation fails to sufficiently specify the easement's
boundaries or location, rendering it void.4
The court of appeals found, and the County does not disagree, that the
reservation adequately identifies its purpose, the dominant and servient estates,
and "Bird's intent to reserve an easement." Evans v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
2004 UT App 256,110, 97 P.3d 697. The reservation also clearly states that the
easement is fifty-six feet wide.

But neither do the parties dispute that the

reservation fails to specify the easement's length or its location over the 91,200
square feet of the Strip. The absence of these latter, essential terms nullifies the
easement.
Upon considering a situation almost identical to that presented here, the
court of appeals panel deciding Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533,
concluded that the reservation at issue in that case was void. There, an easement
was reserved in a special warranty deed through which Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
conveyed 1.58 acres to Villatek, Inc. See id. at fI2-3. The deed stated that the
4

The court of appeals noted that, "because Bird may have acquired its property
interest [in Pine Street] with reference to the plat map," the first part of the
easement may be more properly characterized as an exception, rather than a
reservation. Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 110 n.3, 97 P.3d 697. This technical
distinction, however, has lost most of its substantive meaning. See Hartman v.
Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) ("[S]ince the terms are often used
interchangeably, the distinction has been disregarded to a great extent ...."). For
that reason, and because the County's argument focuses on the second part of the
easement (which is properly characterized as a reservation), the County herein
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conveyance was "'Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 Feet Of Said
Property, For The Purpose Of A Proposed Road.'" Id. at ^[10 (quoting the special
warranty deed). Through a series of subsequent transfers, the Potters ended up
owning a portion of the 1.58 acres. Years later, and after the Potters had built
improvements on the never-used strip without objection, Chadaz, who claimed the
reservation was for her benefit, asserted the easement over the property. The
Potters then sued to quiet title and prevailed on a motion for summary judgment.
Seeid.tiL<i5.
Relying extensively on its prior decision in Warburton, the court of appeals
observed that "'[wjords that clearly show intention to grant an easement are
sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term/" Id. at %9
(quoting Warburton, 899 P.2d at 782) (secondary internal quote omitted). In
upholding the trial court's decision, the court of appeals determined that the
reservation "fail[edl to meet the requirements of an express easement." Id. at %l 1.
While the court found that the parties intended to create an express easement, it
held that their failure to specify the easement's boundaries and exact location
rendered it unenforceable:
Although it appears the parties intended to create an express easement,
the language in the deed is not sufficiently detailed. In fact, it does not
specify the boundaries of the easement or its exact location. This vague

refers to the easement language as a reservation.
8

language does not constitute a definite and ascertainable description of
the property.
A/, at 111.
The court of appeals acknowledged Potter's factual similarity to the present
case. See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 114, 97 P.3d 697 ("Admittedly, there are
factual similarities between Potter and the instant case."). As in Potter, neither the
grantor, grantee, nor the interest granted are in doubt here. The easement asserted
in the present case, like the one at issue in Potter, has never been used. (R. at 218,
238-29, 275, 277-78, 341-42, 417-20, 476/45 & /46.) And, as in Potter, the
County has developed over most of the possible locations for Evans's easement
(removing a significant amount of soil from the platted, yet unimproved Pine
Street) without objection.

(R. at 208, 277, 310-12, 390, 476/10-/12, 476/62;

Addendum at A48-A50.) Most importantly, the easement in Potter was described
as a road right of way over the east sixty-six feet of the conveyed property. See
Potter, 1999 UT App 95,110, 977 P.2d 533. Similarly, the second part of Evans's
easement is a road right of way traversing the conveyed Strip. (Stmt, of Facts f2.)
Indeed, the reservation in Potter actually was more specific than Evans's. The
Potter reservation somewhat specified where on the property the easement was
located: the east sixty-six feet. In contrast, Evans's reservation merely defines the
width of the right of way as fifty-six feet. It provides no direction as to where it
should be located over the 760-foot length of the two-acre Strip.
9

Despite the instant case's favorable factual comparison to Potter, the court
of appeals nevertheless concluded "that the deed language in this case is
sufficiently detailed to create an enforceable easement." Evans, 2004 UT App
256, 114, 97 P.3d 697. Based principally upon extrajurisdictional case law, some
of it unpublished, the court held that Evans's reservation needed only to identify
the easement's dominant and servient estates and its purpose. See id. at H9-15.
Thus, under the court of appeals's interpretation, easements that fail to identify
their boundaries or location may still be valid if these other three elements are
sufficiently identified.

However, an analysis of the applicable rules of

construction reveals the court's resort to extrajurisdictional decisions to formulate
this standard is unwarranted.
"Interpretation of easements and restrictive covenants follows the same
rules of construction used in interpreting contracts." Canyon Meadows Home
Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414,17, 40 P.3d 1148. Cf. Ault v.
Holden, 2002 UT 33, 137, 44 P.3d 781 ("Deeds are construed like other written
legal instruments.").

"The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a

contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract." WebBank v.
American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,117, 54 P.3d 1139. To ascertain
the parties' intentions, Utah courts look to the contract's plain language. "'If the
language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties"

10

intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and
the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.'" Id. at \\9 (quoting Cent. Fla.
Invests., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3,112, 40 P.3d 599). "However, if the
language of the contract is ambiguous such that the intentions of the parties cannot
be determined by the plain language of the agreement, 'extrinsic evidence must be
looked to in order to determine the intentions of the parties.'" Id. (quoting Central
Florida, 2002 UT 3,112, 40 P.3d 599).
A contract plagued by ambiguity, though, differs from one with
insufficiently specific terms, as do the legal consequences in each situation.
Hence, "the fact that the terms [of a contract] are insufficient does not make them
ambiguous for the purpose of admitting extrinsic evidence."

Warburton v.

Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 783 n.8 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). This statement from the Warburton court reflects "the general proposition
that a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the obligations of the
parties are 'set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.'" Ferris
v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) (quoting Overmeyer v. Brown, 439
F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971)). This Court recently reinforced that parties to a
contract must sufficiently specify its essential terms to make it enforceable:
The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the parties'
intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually
existed, there can be no contract to enforce. "A contract may be
enforced even though some contract terms may be missing or left to be
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agreed upon, but if the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no
basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken,
there is no contract."
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 112, 78 P.3d 600 (quoting Acad. Chicago
Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (111. 1991) (citations omitted)). The
essential terms of a valid contract must be sufficiently definite because they
evidence a meeting of the contracting parties' minds. "'It is fundamental that a
meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the
formation of a contract.

An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are

indefinite.'" Id. at %l\ (quoting Richard Barton Enter., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d
368, 373 (Utah 1996)).
This Court held an asserted modification invalid in Barton because,
although the trial court "found that the parties had agreed to the 'concept' of a rent
abatement," the amount or a method of calculating it was not supplied. Id. at 373.
The Court explained that, "when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or a
method for determining one, 'the agreement is too indefinite and uncertain for
enforcement.'"

Id. at 373-74 (quoting Joseph M. Perillo et ai, Corbin on

Contracts § 4.3 at 568 (rev. ed. 1993)).
This language from the Barton court reveals that the parties' articulation of
methods for determining essential terms also can satisfy the requirement of
sufficient definiteness. See also Ferris, 595 P.2d at 859 ("A contract is not fatally

12

defective as to price if there is an agreement as to some formula or method for
fixing it." (footnote omitted)). In Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), for
example, this Court noted that language granting a right of selection to one of the
parties did not invalidate the contract. "The fact [that] the vendee has the right to
select the specific property subsequent to the initial agreement does not render the
agreement uncertain or invalid." Id. at 1378 n.14.
Under the foregoing law, because Evans's reservation fails to sufficiently
define the essential terms of the easement's boundaries and location or to provide
any mechanism to determine them, it should be held unenforceable.
"[T]he law in this state is plain: A right of way founded on a deed or grant
is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Labrum v. Rickenbach,
711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985). Consequently, the extent of a right of way
constitutes an essential term that the parties to a reservation must sufficiently
define. Since the extent of a right of way is determined by its boundaries and
location, it follows that those terms are essential as well.
Utah decisions addressing non-deed property conveyances demonstrate that
the boundaries and location of an easement are essential terms. In Wasatch Mines
Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), this Court found that the
documents in question did not convey an interest in land because they failed to
"give a sufficient description of the property to determine the boundaries of the

13

area which the alleged grantee may enter and remove soil." Id. at 1010. The
Court so concluded because "the documents [did] not identify the grantor, the
grantee, the interest granted, or a description of the boundaries in a manner
sufficient to construe the instruments as a conveyance of an interest in land." Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals later relied on these four elements in its
Warburton decision to find a purported easement invalid because it violated the
statute of frauds. Although the court's analysis focused on the third criterion (the
interest granted), it noted that "all four Wasatch Mines elements are important."
Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781 n.4. The court suggested that the agreement at issue
"was probably deficient in other elements as well," pointing out that it "probably
did not provide an adequate boundary description because the [easement property]
was not even in existence at the time" the agreement was made. Id. Similarly, in
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court of
appeals implicitly applied three of the Wasatch Mines elements to determine that
an alleged easement was unenforceable. The court found that the document under
consideration did not "define with specificity the property interest claimed," nor
did it identify the grantors or grantees.

Southland, 760 P.2d at 322.

After

mentioning these deficiencies, the court observed that "[w]hen the parties leave
material matters so obscure and undefined that the court cannot say whether the
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minds of the parties met upon all the essentials or upon what substantial terms they
agreed, the case is not one for specific performance." Id.
In fact, the court of appeals has not limited its reliance on the four Wasatch
Mines elements to analyses in non-deed contexts.

In Kelly v. Hard Money

Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 87 P.3d 734, the court used the four elements as
guideposts to interpret a warranty deed. Citing the four Wasatch Mines elements
(but quoting more recent decisions), and finding no dispute as to the grantor, the
interest granted, or the description of boundaries, the court's analysis centered on
whether the deed sufficiently identified the grantee. The court held that it did, and
rejected the argument that mere misnomer of the assignee as "PCO Holdings, Inc."
instead of "PCO Holding Company, Inc." was legally insufficient. Id. at ^21-23.
The court of appeals did nothing new by using these elements to analyze the
warranty deed in Kelly. For years, this Court has required parties to describe
property conveyed by deed in sufficiently definite terms or risk having the
conveyance voided. "It is not to be questioned that in order to be valid, the deed
must contain a sufficiently definite description to identify the property it conveys."
Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) (footnote omitted). See also
Ault, 2002 UT 33,126, 44 P.3d 781 ("In Utah, a warranty deed conveys title so
long as the deed's description of the property is 'sufficiently definite ... to identify
the property it conveys.'" (quoting Colman, 556 P.2d at 505)); Howard v.
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Howard, 367 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1962) (nullifying deed because "[e]ither it is
impossible to determine what grantor had in mind or, conjecture indulged, one
would have to divine that any number of areas could be said to have been
intended").
The court's analysis in Potter was therefore consistent with the four
Wasatch Mines elements. While the special warranty deed sufficiently specified
the grantor, the grantee, and the interest granted, it failed to identify the
easement's boundaries or location. See Potter, 1999 UT App 95, 1110-11, 977
P.2d 533.
Utah courts' insistence that parties supply sufficiently definite descriptions
of property interests and boundaries to validly convey real property, whether by
deed or otherwise, coupled with the principle that an easement's extent (i.e., its
boundaries and location) is determined by the language of the conveying
instrument, compel the conclusion that the boundaries and location of an easement
are essential terms that must be sufficiently specified for the conveyance to be
valid.
The property description in Evans's reservation is insufficient. Although it
specifies the easement's width (fifty-six feet) and describes it as crossing the Strip
between Pine Street and Evans's property, the information stops there.

The

reservation provides no guidance for locating its termini, no description of its
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length, no information on what path it follows across the 760-foot-long and 120foot-wide Strip, nor does it provide any method for ascertaining these terms.
(Stmt, of Facts fl.)

Without this information, the possible boundaries and

locations of the easement are myriad. Consequently, the reservation's failure to
sufficiently specify these essential terms nullifies it.
Instead of applying the rules of contract construction and the Wasatch
Mines elements it embraced at least implicitly in its prior decisions like Potter, the
court of appeals's decision below diverged from its precedent to establish a new,
liberalized standard for gauging the validity of easement reservations.
The court of appeals's altered approach also carries negative consequences
for parties to such conveyances and the state's courts. If parties to express
easements need only identify an easement's purpose and its dominant and servient
estates, the boundaries and locations of easements across properties much larger
than the parcel at issue here for more unusual purposes inevitably will be left
unstated without any indication how those terms will be decided. While prudent
and sophisticated parties will attempt to avoid the potential for litigation by
specifying these terms or a method for determining them, many parties will not
exercise such foresight. Consequently, with the passage of time and its attendant
multiplication of conveyances, waning memories, and inevitable disagreements
over the locations and boundaries of such easements, the state's courts likely will
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become embroiled in factually intensive disputes, exacting significant private and
public expenditures. As with deeds, sound public policy demands the boundaries
and locations of express easements be stated in sufficiently definite terms. Simply
categorizing such inadequately described easements as floating or roving does not
avoid this adverse impact.
II.

BIRD'S FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFY HIS RESERVED
EASEMENT DOES NOT TRANSFORM IT INTO AN ACCEPTABLE
"FLOATING" OR "ROVING" EASEMENT.
Relying on Walker, the court of appeals stated that, "[w]hen a deed

containing an easement grant does not fix the location of the easement, the 'grant
constitutes a 'floating' or 'roving' easement, ....'" Evans, 2004 UT App 256 at
117, 97 P.3d 697 (quoting Walker, 253 P.2d at 368). This notion, however,
oversteps the traditional rules of contract construction, as explained above.
Parties' failure to reserve an easement using sufficiently specific terms does not
excuse them from the application of these rules.

Rather, floating or roving

easements are created when the involved parties intend to create them, just as with
all other easements. Because it is apparent that Bird did not intend to create a
floating or roving easement, but instead failed to describe his fixed reservation
with sufficiently definite terms, it is void.
Two Utah decisions address floating or roving easements in a way pertinent
to the issues presented here: Walker and Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton
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Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989).

In Flying Diamond, the agreement

language said to be creating the floating or roving easement at issue generally
granted easements to enter the property to prospect, extract, and transport oil and
gas from wherever it was found.

See Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 620-21.

Similarly, in Walker the deed granted an easement for water improvements
"'wherever'" Salt Lake City located them. See Walker, 253 P.2d at 366 (quoting
the deed language). Thus, the language describing the easements in both of these
cases intentionally left their boundaries and locations to be defined by other,
future events.

In other words, although the easements did not specify their

boundaries and locations in the conveyances themselves, they did specify methods
for determining those essential terms, which, as explained above, is sufficient.
It is in this context that the language from Walker quoted by the court of
appeals below must be understood. In the Walker opinion, this Court quoted the
deed language at issue, emphasizing specific words to illustrate that the parties
intended to locate the easement wherever the city located water conduits on the
property.

See id. at 368. The Court then explained that this kind of grant,

meaning a grant that did not attempt to "specifically fix" the easement's location
but nevertheless provided a method for ascertaining it, was a floating or roving
easement that could be located by (1) agreement; (2) acquiescent use; (3) right of
selection; or (4) necessity:
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Such grant constitutes a 'floating' or 'roving' easement, the
location of which may be fixed by agreement of the parties, by the
use of a particular way by the grantee with the acquiescence of the
grantor for a considerable period of time, or by one party in whom
the grant vests the right of selection or the right to fix the grant, or
where the rule of necessity determines the location because any other
place would annul, ruin, or militate against the grant.
Id. Both the Flying Diamond and Walker grants described one or more of these
methods for locating the easements at issue. In Flying Diamond, "[t]he easements
c[a]me into being as they bec[a]me 'necessary or convenient' for the activities of
prospecting for and producing[ J oil, gas, and liquid hydrocarbons which [were]
under the surface of the land in question ...." Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 626
(quoting agreement language). In Walker, "the location or site of the right of way
[was] settled, by selection of locations by the City as provided in the deed, and
also by the long lapse (since 1906) since construction of the conduit without
objections." Walker, 253 P.2d at 368.
Below, the court of appeals quoted the Walker language outlining the four
methods for locating floating easements, but, without explanation, substituted
"[s]uch grant" with "a deed containing an easement grant [that] does not fix the
location of the easement." Evans, 2004 UT App \\1, 97 P.3d 697. With this
seemingly innocuous change, the court of appeals expanded the definition of
floating or roving easements from those intentionally left to be located by methods
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specified in the grant to now include those that parties intended, yet failed, to fix
in the grant language.
This Court's description of floating or roving easements in Flying Diamond
supports the more limited definition announced in Walker. In Flying Diamond,
this Court explained that the agreement at issue granted "a variety of what are in
effect 'floating easements/ and those easements are subject to definition by such
unpredictable circumstances as [(in that case)] the locations of wells, density of
well locations, storage facilities, roads to well sites, and pipelines."

Flying

Diamond, 776 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). This unpredictability epitomizes
floating or roving easements, not a failure to describe fixed easements in
sufficiently definite terms.
Evans's reservation falls into the latter category. None of the four methods
for locating the easements identified in Walker are present. Nor does Evans's
reservation bear any of the indicia of the floating easements at issue in Walker and
Flying Diamond. Its location is not subject to any unpredictable circumstances
like where the government decides to locate an improvement or where oil deposits
might be discovered.

Rather, Evans's reservation is an insufficiently specific

attempt to fix the location of an access easement.
In its criticism of the trial court's reliance on Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351
(Utah 1952), to hold that it could not fix the location of Evans's easement, the

21

court of appeals appears to interpret that case as involving a floating easement.
See Evans, 2004 UT App HI8-20, 97 P.3d 697.

Evans agreed with that

characterization in his brief opposing the County's petition for a writ of certiorari,
grouping Wood with Flying Diamond and Walker. (Br. in Opp'n to Cert, at 4-7.)
Wood, however, provides no guidance here for at least two reasons.
Foremost is the fact that Wood did not involve a floating easement.
Nowhere in that decision is the easement referred to as floating or roving. Instead,
the deed at issue reserved "a 'right of way for road purposes across' the land
conveyed." Wood, 253 P.2d at 353 (quoting conveyance). Although a gate had
been constructed that the grantor and his successors used for access to the
remaining property, they argued they had an unrestricted easement over the
conveyed property because they had farmed it. See id. at 352-53. This Court
disagreed, holding that "[t]he words 'for road purposes across' indicate[d] a
restricted rather than a general reservation ..." Id. at 353. To the extent the terms
"unrestricted" and "floating" may be interchangeable, the Wood decision actually
confirms that Evans's easement is not floating.

Like the easement in Wood,

Evans's easement explicitly reserves an easement for a road "to provide access to
grantor's remaining land." (Stmt, of Facts <f2.)
The Court further held that "[t]he construction of the fence and gate
allowing ingress and egress was a practical construction of the deed by the parties
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and established the location of the right of way." Wood, 253 P.2d at 354. It
reached this conclusion after observing that, "[w]here the provisions of a deed are
doubtful the court may also look to the practical construction placed upon the
instrument by the parties." Id. at 353. Below, the court of appeals characterized
this reference to the parties' practical construction as "a straightforward approach
to fixing the location of a 'floating easement'...." Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 118.
"Under the doctrine of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous and
the parties place their own construction on their agreement and so perform, the
court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what their true intention was."
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975). As shown here, however,
Evans's reservation is not simply ambiguous, it is void because it lacks
sufficiently specific essential terms. See supra, Part I. The term "floating" is not
synonymous with "ambiguous."

Accordingly, Wood's resort to the parties'

practical construction does not mean that the reservation at issue in that case was
floating.
In fact, the question whether the easement existed was not at issue in Wood,
which provides the second reason the decision is unhelpful. The issue in Wood
was whether deed "reserved to the grantor a general and unrestricted right of
way." Wood, 253 P.2d at 353. Consequently, the issue of whether the reservation
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was sufficiently specific was not before the Court, and any conclusions drawn
from the decision on that point constitute speculation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold Evans's reservation void
for failure to sufficiently specify essential terms describing the easement's
boundaries and location, reversing the court of appeals's decision on this point.
This holding would obviate the court of appeals's order remanding the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.

DATED this 21st day of December, 2004.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Barton H. Kunz II
>
Craig V. Wentz
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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THORNE, Judge:
Hi
Jamie Evans appeals from the trial court's grant of the
Board of County Commissioners' (the Board) motion for summary
judgment. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
1(2
In 1926, Knight Investment Company (Knight), with the
knowledge and permission of- Utah County and Provo City,
subdivided land it owned south of Provo. Knight divided the
property into several lots and platted a network of roads,
including Pine Street, which Knight then dedicated for public
use. Knight titled the area the "Ironton Plat." At a later
date, the R.L. Bird Company (Bird) purchased several pieces of
property in and around the Ironton Plat. The property included:
Several platted lots within the Ironton Plat (the Lots), a strip
of land abutting the southeast boundary of the Ironton Plat (the
Strip)--when used in conjunction we will address the Strip and
the Lots as "the Property"--and an expanse of land surrounding
the southeast corner of the Ironton Plat and connected to the

Strip (the Corner Property). Both the Strip and the Lots abut
Pine Street. There is a conflict as to whether the Corner
Property abuts Pine street at its terminus.
f3
Barring certain improvements not material to this case,
neither Knight, nor its assigns, ever developed the Ironton Plat
as intended.
f4
In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interests in the Lots and the
Strip to Utah County (the County), reserving to itself and the
Corner Property an easement and right-of-way over the Strip and
Pine Street. The reservation allowed Bird to access the State
highway from the Corner Property. Specifically, the reservation
read:
Reserving to the grantor the public use and
right-of-way over and into Pine Street from
the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way
over and across the last parcel of land
[included in the quit claim deed (the
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with
grantor's remaining property over which Utah
County agrees to build a good gravel road
within 90 days of the date of this
instrument, to provide access to grantor's
remaining land.
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The County accepted the deed as written and, subsequently,
the County built a Public Works Facility upon some of the land.
The facility currently includes a public works building, a
service station, and a parking lot. In the course of
construction, the County removed a large amount of earth from
areas in and around Pine street as platted. In 1995, Bird
conveyed its interest in the Corner Property, including its
easement and right-of-way, to Jamie and Terry Evans (Evans). The
easement language in the corrected deed closely tracked the
language from Bird's 1983 quit-claim deed to the County.1
1[6
In 1996, the County vacated several of the platted and
dedicated Ironton Plat streets, but left Pine Street as a
dedicated street. Evans subsequently filed suit challenging the

1. Although Bird failed to include easement language in its
original deed to Evans, "[a] corrective deed relates back to the
time of the original conveyance." Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT
133,^21, 63 P.3d 721. Consequently, because Bird filed a
corrected deed, we read Evans's deed to the Corner Property to
include the easement language.

vacation order and seeking to enforce his easement.2 In July
2002, following the cessation of settlement talks, the trial
court entertained argument on the County's summary judgment
motion. Although the court's order contained several dispositive
rulings, Evans challenges only that portion dealing with his
easement right. The court ruled that Evans's easement was
invalid because (1) Pine Street had no physical existence or
historical use, (2) the easement area, as described, contained no
existing fixtures to which an easement could attach, and (3) the
easement language was fatally vague. Evans appeals. We reverse
and remand.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
fl7 Evans appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
"We affirm summary judgment only when 'there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.'" Arnold Indus. v. Love,
2002 UT 133,flll, 63 P.3d 721 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c))
(ellipsis in original). "We grant the trial court's legal
conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (quotations
and citations omitted).
The ultimate determination of whether an
easement exists is a conclusion of law, which
we review for correctness. However, the
existence of an easement is also a highly
fact-dependent question; therefore, we accord
the trial judge a measure of discretion when
applying the correct legal standard to the
facts, and overturn a ruling concerning the
existence of an easement only if the judge
exceeded the discretion granted.
Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105,flll, 37 P.3d 1112 (citation
omitted).

2. Evans's complaint challenged the vacation order, claimed that
the County had deprived him of his due process rights, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, argued that the County was in breach of
contract, and sought a declaratory judgment recognizing his right
to enforce the easement.

ANALYSIS
I.

Statute of Frauds, Vagueness, and Unfixed Location

1|8
The County argues that Bird's reservation violated the
statute of frauds, that it was too vague to create a cognizable
easement, and that the absence of a fixed location, under these
circumstances, renders the reservation invalid. We address each
assertion in turn.
a.

Statute of Frauds

%9
Express easements involve real property interests. See
Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). As
such, to survive, an express easement must satisfy the statute of
frauds. See Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he preferred way to
transfer an interest in land and meet the requirements of the
statute of frauds is by deed." Id. However, "' [a]11 that is
required is that the interest be granted or declared by a writing
subscribed by the party to be charged.1" Smith v. Osguthorpe,
2002 UT App 361,1(24, 58 P.3d 854 (citation omitted). "Words that
'clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient,
provided the language is certain and definite in its term[s].'"
Warburton, 899 P.2d at 782 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 604
P.2d 366, 368 (1979)). "While conveyances of land must contain a
description of the land sufficient to locate it without recourse
to oral testimony, easements need only encumber a specific
servient estate." Benis v. Shoreridge Water Coop., 1998 Wash.
App. LEXIS 1172, at **8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1998).
"Besides describing the area subject to the easement, the
conveyance granting or reserving an easement should also refer to
its purpose." Id. at *9. However, "[t]he failure of an easement
description to specify details, such as the exact location . . .
does not render the easement excessively vague or unenforceable."
Egidi v. Libertwille, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
Finally, when an easement arises through a deed reservation, the
absence of the grantee's signature does not, necessarily, violate
the statute of frauds. See Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 644
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "the covenant which ran with the
land was not invalid for the grantee's omitted signature on the
deed"); Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND LICENSES IN LAND-EASEMENT GRANT OR RESERVATION, § 3.1
(Thompson West 2004) ("However, in the case of the creation of an
easement by deed reservation, the grantee's signature is not
required.").
^|l0 In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interest in the Property to
the County. However, in the quit-claim deed Bird included the
following language:
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Reserving to the grantor [Bird] the public
use and right-of way over and into Pine
Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide
right-of-way over and across the last parcel
of land [the Strip], from Pine Street to
connect with the grantor's remaining
property.
Thus, Bird transferred its interest in the Property, and reserved
an easement or an exception through the deed. The deed noted
both the dominant and the servient estate, established the
purpose of the easement or exception,3 and clearly indicated
Bird's intent to reserve an easement when it conveyed the
property. Moreover, the County accepted and recorded Bird's
quit-claim deed as written; consequently, the County is "charged
with knowledge of its contents," and cannot now claim ignorance
or lack of agreement. Chase, 507 N.E.2d at 644. Accordingly,
Bird's easement, which was transferred to Evans, does not violate
the statute of frauds, and to the extent that the trial court
concluded that it did, we reverse its conclusion.4

3. "When an easement has been in existence for many years at the
time it is mentioned in the deed, it is an exception, not a
reservation." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licences § 19 n.94
(citing Barrett v. Kunz, 604 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Vt. 1992)). Bird's
interest in Pine Street, if any, arose some years before Bird
conveyed its interest to the County. There is no question that
Bird did not own Pine Street, it being a street platted for
public use. However, because Bird may have acquired its property
interest with reference to the plat map, it may have acquired a
right-of-way over Pine Street, which it could then reserve.
Thus, Bird's interest in Pine Street is properly characterized as
an exception, rather than a reservation. See 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Easements & Licenses § 19 ("Since an exception in a conveyance
operates *co exclude from the terms cf the granting clause some
right or interest which would otherwise pass to the grantee,
strictly speaking, an easement cannot be created by exception;
nevertheless, an easement may be created by an exception of
an existing way . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); cf. Barrett, 604
A.2d at 1281 ("Because the easement had been in existence for
many years at the time it was specifically mentioned in the
deed . . . , it was an 'exception,' rather than a reservation
.

. . . ") .

4. Although the trial court mentioned the statute of frauds in
its findings and conclusions, it did not expressly find that
Bird's reservation violated the statute of frauds. Rather, the
court focused its analysis on its determination that the easement
was invalid due to vagueness.
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b.

Vagueness

llll The County, relying on Potter v. Chadez, 1999 UT App 95, 977
P.2d 533, argues that the language Bird utilized in its deed to
the County is fatal to Evans's present easement claim. We
disagree.
1|l2 The trial court concluded that the reservation as a whole
was void because the reservation language was vague, the easement
location was not fixed by the deed, and no fixtures existed from
which the court could fix the easement location. "A right of way
founded on a deed or grant is limited to the uses and extent
fixed by the instrument." Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225,
227 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). "It is also established in
this state that a deed should be construed so as to effectuate
the intentions of and desires of the parties, as manifested by
the language made use of in the deed." Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah
580, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (1952).5 "Further, when [a] deed creates
an easement the circumstances attending the transaction, the
situation of the parties, and the object to be attained are also
to be considered." Id.; see also Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp.,
791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) ("The paramount rule of
construction of deeds is to give effect to the intent of the
parties as expressed in the deed as a whole."). The deed "must
contain a description of the land that is to be subjected to the
easement with sufficient clarity to locate it with reasonable
certainty. However, it is not necessary to designate with
definiteness the part of the land to which the right attaches."
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 18 (1996) (footnotes
omitted); see also Hall v. Allen, 771 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1989)
5. It is also widely accepted that "'an express easement . . .
requires "mutual assent by the parties manifesting their
intention to be bound by its terms."1" Potter v. Chadez, 1999 UT
App 95,119, 977 P. 2d 533 (alterations in original) (quoting Green
v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (additional
citations omitted)). In this case, the County's decision to
accept and record the quit claim deed signaled its intention to
be bound by the agreement. See Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640,
644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "the covenant which ran with
the land was not invalid for the grantee's omitted signature on
the deed"); John W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., THE LAW OF
EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND-EASEMENT GRANT OR RESERVATION,
§ 3.1 (Thompson West 2004) ("However, in the case of the creation
of an easement by deed reservation, the grantee's signature is
not required."); see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses
§ 18 (1996) ("Acceptance by the grantee of a deed conveying an
easement in express terms brings the easement into existence
without any further act on the part of the grantee showing his
acceptance of the easement itself.").
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omitted); see also Hall v. Allen, 771 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1989)
(en banc) ("An easement may be created even though its precise
location is not described in the grant."); Mitchell v. Chance,
2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218, at *13 (Term. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2004)
("Even though drafters of express easements should prepare a
legal description of both the servient tenement and the precise
portion of the servient tenement over which the easement runs,
deeds or other instruments failing to indicate an easement's
location or dimensions are commonplace. However, these sorts of
omissions and oversights are not necessarily fatal to the
easement." (citations omitted)). "When a deed creating an
easement explicitly refers to an existing road, the courts
commonly construe the location and dimensions of the intended
easement to conform with the location and dimensions of the
road." Mitchell, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218, at **15-16.
1|l3 Here, Bird conveyed the Property to the County, but
specifically reserved a fifty-six-foot right-of-way over the
Strip, as well as a private easement over Pine Street. The
purpose of the easement was clear: Bird intended to preserve its
preexisting access between the Corner Property and the state
highway. Both the Strip and Pine Street are clearly identified,
either in the plat map or within the deed. "By accepting the
deed, [the County is] charged with knowledge of its contents. If
the easement was unsatisfactory, [the County] was free to refuse
the deed." Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) . Thus, when the County accepted the deed, it accepted the
terms and the easement was brought into existence. Potter does
not alter this outcome.
^14 In Potter, after examining language which purported to
create an easement for a "stranger to the deed," we concluded
that "the language in the deed [was] not sufficiently detailed
[because the] vague language [did] not constitute a definite and
ascertainable description of the property." Potter, 1999 UT App
95 at HKll-12. Admittedly, there are factual similarities
between Potter and the instant case. However, we conclude that
the deed language in this case is sufficiently detailed to create
an enforceable easement.
Hl5 From the language in the deed we are able to discern that
the Strip is the servient estate, the Corner Property is the
dominant estate, and the purpose of the easement is to allow the
holder of the Corner Property to move between the Corner Property
and the nearby state highway. To this end, the parties agreed to
establish a fifty-six-foot wide roadway over the Strip, which
would allow Bird, or its assigns, to cross from the Corner
Property and onto Pine Street. Pine Street would then be used as
the transport portal to reach the highway. In light of this
clear and detailed language, we conclude that the trial court

erred in determining that the language in the deed was vague and
therefore fatal to Evans ! s easement.
c.

Fixing the Easement's Location

Hl6 The trial court also found that the easement failed "because
there exists no physical improvement, fixture, or use of Pine
Street" that could be used to fix the location of the easement.
Because the location of Pine Street is platted and the plat
contains the metes and bounds defining the area that comprises
Pine Street, we presume that the trial court's focus was on the
absence of fixtures or improvements that could be used to fix the
location of the easement over the Strip.
1)17 When a deed containing an easement grant does not fix the
location of the easement, the
grant constitutes a "floating" or "roving"
easement, the location of which may be fixed
by agreement of the parties, by the
[acquiescent] use of a particular way . . .
for a considerable period of time, or by one
party in whom the grant vests the right of
selection or the right to fix the grant, or
where the rule of necessity determines the
location because any other place would annul,
ruin or militate against the grant.
Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 123 Utah 1, 253 P.2d 365,
368 (1953).
118 Relying on Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351 (1952),
and Walker, the trial court concluded that it could not
"reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the
easement by virtue of existing features." This does not
accurately reflect either the requirements of the law or the
holdings of Ashby or Walker. In Wood, the court: was faced with
determining the location amd purpose of an easement that had been
granted through a deed. See Wood, 2 53 P.2d at 3 52. The deed, as
conveyed, reserved to the "grantors a right of way for road
purposes." Id. However, as time passed, the grantor's
successors in interest asserted a "general and unrestricted right
of way" over the property." Id. at 353. The court's analysis
began by noting that deeds should be construed "so as to
effectuate the intentions and desires of the parties." Id. at
353. The court further established that, to make this
determination properly, trial courts must examine "the
circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the
parties, and the object to be attained." Id. Then, the court
identified what may be best described as a straightforward
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approach to fixing the location of a "floating easement,"
stating: "Where the provisions of a deed are doubtful the court
may also look to the practical construction placed upon the
instrument by the parties." Id.
Kl9 Applying this standard, the Wood court examined the facts of
the case. See id. at 353-54. The court noted that the easement
was established "to obtain a way in and out of the . . .
property." Id. The court then determined that the transaction
created an easement, and not a fee simple interest, and that
under the circumstances a practical construction of the easement
terms was the most efficient means to determine the easement *s
location. See id. Consequently, after describing an existing
fence and gate that bounded the servient estate, which had
traditionally defined the ingress and egress path used by the
holder of the easement, the court concluded that the gate
described the location of the right-of-way. See id. at 353-54.
Thus, the court utilized the parties' historical practical
construction of the easement to fix its location; it did not,
however, establish a rule requiring reliance on such a
construction.
120 Wood does not mandate the invalidation of an otherwise valid
"floating" easement in the absence of fixtures, improvements, or
historical use. The court's use of the word "may" in its
analysis reflects its reliance on "practical construction" and
suggests that the trial court is granted discretion to consider
such factors, but that considering such factors is certainly not
required. Cf. State v. Mclntvre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879, 881
(1937) (concluding that the use of the word "may" "indicates a
grant of power and not a limitation"); Crockett v. Crockett, 836
P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("According to its ordinary
construction the word "may" means permissive, and it should
receive that interpretation . . . . " ) .
i|21 Similarly, in Walker, the court was asked to determine the
extent and location of a deed granted right-of-way, which did
"not specifically fix the [easement's] location []or width."
Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. The court, after noting that such a
grant constitutes "a 'floating' or 'roving1 easement," concluded
that "the location or site of the right of way is settled, by
selection of locations by the City as provided in the deed, and
also by the long lapse (since 1906) since construction of the
conduit without objections." Id. Consequently, the location of
the easement was not central to the case. However, prior to
drawing that conclusion, the court articulated several methods
that can be used to fix the location of a "floating" easement,
including historical usage and practical construction. See id.
Moreover, although the Walker court relied on a practical
construction, nothing in the opinion suggests that any one of the
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outlined acceptable methods is preferable, and three of the
acceptable methods--agreement of the parties, the rule of
necessity, and the right of selection--require no reliance on
past use or improvements to fix the easement location.
|22 In the instant case, the deed does not fix the location of
the right-of-way over the Strip. The language in the deed,
however, does clearly identify the dominant and servient estates,
the width of the right-of-way, and its purpose. Consequently,
Evans's easement is a valid "floating" or "roving" easement, "the
location of which may be fixed" by the trial court utilizing any
one of the factors articulated by the Walker court. See id.
II.

The Propriety of Bird's Reservation and Exception6

H23 Evans argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
Bird could not reserve a right-of-way over Pine Street when Bird
conveyed its interests in the Property to the County. "'Since it
is manifest that a grantee may receive only what a grantor has to
give, [Evans's] rights are based upon a construction of the
original . . . deed.'" Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah
1982) (quoting Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 353
(1952)) (ellipsis in original). "Under our law, a landowner
whose property abuts a public road possesses, by operation of
law, a private easement of access to that property across the
public road." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 1993)
(citations omitted); see also Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501,
126 P. 959, 962 (1912) (stating "the abutting landowner, besides
his right as one of the public, may acquire a right to private
easements, even if he never owned the fee of the soil in the
highway"). Moreover,
[i]t is manifest to all that, where property
is sold by a vendor and purchased by a vendee
with reference to a map or plat which shows
that such propei~ty abuts upon a public
highway, such maip or plat may amount to and
may be considered as an implied covenant by
the vendor that the highway is what it
purports to be, and that it will not be
obstructed or interfered with by him. A
vendee may also assume (and such assumption
is supported by law) that the other abutting
6. There seems to be no question that Bird possessed the right
to attempt to reserve an easement over the Strip when it was
conveyed to the County. Consequently, our analysis is restricted
to Bird's attempt to reserve or exclude a right-of-way over Pine
Street.
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owners may not obstruct the highway so as to
prevent him from passing along any portion of
the highway to and from his property which
abuts thereon.
Tuttle, 126 P. at 963; see Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105,1112,
37 P.3d 1112 ("Under Utah law, landowners whose property abuts
public streets, alleys, and public ways that appear on a plat map
are entitled to a private easement over those public ways."); see
also Filios v. Oak Ridge Forest Corp., 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2972, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1999) ("It is well settled
that when reference to a map is made in the deed which conveys a
lot and that map delineates roadways, even though there is no
express easement granted, in certain circumstances the lot owners
acquire the right to have the streets and highways thereafter
kept open for use in connection with their lands. . . . This is
so even if at the time of the lot transfer the delineated
roadways are not developed." (alterations in original)
(quotations and citation omitted)); Campbell v. Brock, 159 S.E.2d
409, 411 (Ga. 1968) ("'When . . . the owner of a tract or
boundary of land divides it into lots, streets, and alleys,
causes a map or plat of the same to be made and duly recorded
whereby the lots, streets, and alleys are delineated, and sells
the lots with reference thereto, the purchasers acquire private
property rights to the streets and alleys of the subdivision.'"
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Newinaton
Plantation Estates Ass'n v. Newington Plantation Estates, 4 58
S.E.2d 36, 38 (S.C. 1995) ("Absent evidence of the seller's
intent to the contrary, a conveyance of land that references a
map depicting streets conveys to the purchaser, as a matter of
law, a private easement by implication with respect to those
streets, whether or not there is a dedication to public use.").
However, if the street, or streets, at issue were legally vacated
prior to the property being purchased and the easement arising,
the purchaser will not have a private easement right. See
Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at Ul5.
^f24 The County argues that Carrier also requires chat the street
exist as an improved feature of the area. We disagree. Although
it is true that the alley at issue in Carrier had been, to a
certain degree, improved, and had been "open for public use for
over a hundred years," neither condition was central to the
decision. Id. Instead, the court focused its analysis on
whether the alley at issue had been vacated before the plaintiffs
purchased their property. See id. ("Because the alley had not
been legally vacated at the time of plaintiffs' purchase, the
trial court was correct in finding that plaintiffs' reliance on
the plat map entitles them to private easements over the alley
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abutting their properties as depicted on the plat map."). 7
Consequently, instead of adding a threshold element to this
analysis, Carrier merely reaffirms the longstanding doctrine that
a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase
of property with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads
have not been legally vacated prior to the purchase. Cf. Hall v.
North Oaden City, 109 Utah 304, 166 P.2d 221, 224 (rejecting as
unsound " [t]he argument that streets could not properly be
located on the plat of a townsite unless the street was already
in use"), judgment set aside on other grounds on rehearing, 109
Utah 325, 175 P.2d 703 (1946).
125 In the instant case, Pine Street was platted, dedicated, and
recorded, on a plat map in 1926. To date, Pine Street remains a
dedicated street. Bird purchased several lots within the plat
that abut Pine street. However, from the record before this
court, it is impossible to determine when the purchase was made
or if Bird acquired the property with specific reference to the
plat map. Thus, we cannot determine whether or not Bird acquired
a private easement over Pine Street at the time of the purchase,8
and are therefore in no position to determine the validity of
Evans's claim. Moreover, the trial court occupied an equally
unsuitable position in making its determination that Bird had no
right to reserve or except an easement over Pine Street when it
conveyed the Property to the County. Bird's power to reserve or
except the use of Pine Street does not turn simply on the
historic use of Pine Street, but instead on certain facts not

7. The language upon which the County bases its argument is
merely the Carrier court's attempt to distinguish the Carrier
facts from those presented in Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501,
126 P. 959, 962 (1912) . See Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT
105,1114-15, 37 P.3d 1112.
8. Evans does not present a separate argument that Pine Street,
following its dedication, became a public highway over which
Bird, as an abutting landowner, would have had an ingress and
egress easement. See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah
1993) ("Under our law, a landowner whose property abuts a public
road possesses by operation of law, a private easement of access
to that property across the public road."). Thus, we express no
opinion on this issue except to note that whether or not Pine
Street existed as a public highway depends on the law in
existence at the time of its platting. See Mailory v. Taggart,
24 Utah 2d 267, 470 P.2d 254, 256 (1970) (stating "[w]hatever may
be the law now regarding ownership of dedicated streets, the law
in force and effect when the land in the instant matter was
subdivided and platted" is controlling).
A12

presently in the record. Thus, we conclude that the trial court
erred in granting the County summary judgment on this ground.
CONCLUSION
1(26 We reverse the trial court's determination that Evans's
easement is invalid. The language in the deed conveying the
Property to the County satisfies the requirements of the statute
of frauds, and is sufficiently detailed to survive the County's
vagueness challenge. The easement reserved by Bird is a
"floating" or "roving" easement, the location of which may be
fixed through means outlined in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E.
Walker, 123 Utah 1, 253 P.2d 365 (1953). Finally, when a
purchaser of property acquires its interest with reference to a
plat map upon which streets have been platted, the purchaser
concomitantly acquires a private easement over the streets that
cannot thereafter be unreasonably restricted.
K27 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that
Evans's easement was invalid as a matter of law, and we remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMIE EVANS,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 960400821

THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH COUNTY,

Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on
May 14, 2002. Samuel D. McVey appeared for the Plaintiff and Craig V. Wentz appeared for the
Defendant. Upon reviewing the Motion and memoranda filed by the parties, hearing the
arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing,
enters the following Order and Judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
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I.

BACKGROUND

The matter before the Court concerns real property known as the Ironton Plat and
Ordinance 1996-20 affecting such plat which the Board of Utah County Commissioners adopted.
Ordinance 1996-20 vacated certain streets of the plat and Plaintiffs purported ownership of a
private right-of-way over the property. In February 1926, Knight Investment Company recorded
the Ironton Plat and dedicated for public use Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Walnut, Naples, Dupont
and Pine streets. In 1935 Utah County and the Colorado Development Company conveyed land
each owned near or within the Ironton Plat to the State of Utah to be included in the development
of the newly aligned Highway 89 between Provo City to the north and Springville City to the
south. Subsequently, On July 9, 1983, the R.L. Bird Company delivered a quit claim deed to
Utah County that conveyed lots it owned within the Ironton Plat to accommodate the County's
construction of a public works building and a strip of land on the south boundary of the plat.
This quit claim deed contained a reservation which is the subject of Defendant's Motion that
states:
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and into Pine
Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way over and across the
last described parcel of land, from Pine Street to connect with grantor's remaining
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road within 90
days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to grantor's remaining land.
On November 27, 1995, R.L. Bird Company conveyed another portion of its property
located to the south and east of the Ironton Plat to Jamie Evans and Terry Evans (hereinafter
"Plaintiff). In January 1986, the County completed the construction of a public works facility
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that included a building, a service station, and a parking lot within the Ironton Plat. During
construction a substantial amount of material was removed from the hillside located on the west
end of the Pine Street right-of-way. On October 29, 1996, the Board of Utah County
Commissioners (hereinafter "Defendant") adopted Ordinance 1996-20 (hereinafter "UCO 199620"), that vacated the platted Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets. The vacating ordinance UCO
1996-20 as adopted did not vacate platted Yale and Pine Streets or Columbia Avenue.
Seeking to challenge the vacating ordinance Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on
February 7, 1997. Defendant filed its Answer on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, on November 21,
2001, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment to which Plaintiff filed his Opposition
on April 2, 2002, and which was followed by Defendant's Reply on May 8, 2002. Subsequently,
the Court heard oral argument on the Motion on May 14, 2002 and took the Motion under
advisement.
II.

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a judgment shall be rendered
upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Defendant asserts that there is no
genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiffs causes of action are barred under the law. By
its Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the ordinance; and
notwithstanding a lack of standing, the ordinance is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under
U.C.A. 17-27-1001; that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because there is no violation of Plaintiff s
right to due process; that Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is barred by the statute of
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limitations; that Plaintiffs reservation of aright-a-way is void; that Plaintiff failed to file a notice
of claim with the County; and Plaintiffs request for Declaratory Judgment is a redundant cause
of action. Plaintiff denies that Defendant's assertions are a valid bar of his causes of action, but
concedes that his third cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the statute of
limitations. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs wife Mrs. Terry Evans must be added to
the lawsuit because the quit-claim deeds of 1995 and 2001 both contain her name, and, therefore,
she is an indispensable party. As communicated at oral argument, the Court notes that Mrs.
Evans' name does appear on the deeds, and as such the Court would grant Plaintiffs request for
leave to join her as a Plaintiff. Her joinder therefore is not material for the outcome of this
Ruling.
The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiffs claim requesting the Court declare Utah
County Ordinance 1996-20 void pursuant to Utah Code § 17-27-1001, as an arbitrary and
capricious action. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this claim under
U.C.A. § 17-27-1001. Plaintiff, however, contends that his action can be brought under either
under UCA § 17-27-1001 or U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 which does not require standing to enforce a
claim. U.C.A. § 17-27-1001, states in part:
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions made
under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this chapter
until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. . . .
(3) (a) The Court shall:
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
4

(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal,
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision
violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law.
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002, states in pertinent part:
(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the county in
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this
chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies provided by
law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building,
use, or act....
Plaintiff asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 only requires a person own property within the
county. Further, Plaintiff contends that he also has standing to satisfy section 1001 because his
property abuts the subject Naples, Dupont and Pine streets. Defendant, however, asserts that
Plaintiffs arguments fail because he initially brought his action under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 not
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002; that he is challenging the County's land use decision rather than seeking to
enforce provisions of the Land Use Act or the ordinance that the County enacted under its
authority; and he has failed to allege facts that would trigger the application of U.C.A. § 17-271002. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between section 1001 and section 1002

Section 1001 applies only when a party desires to challenge a land use decision.
Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made under the Land Use Act, but
instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it.... Enforcement of the
act and ordinances made pursuant to it is addressed in 1002....

s

Culbertson v Board o,fCounty Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah
2001).
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of the presented
authorities the Court concludes that Plaintiffs claim is contained within section 1001. The Court
notes, however, Plaintiff fails to maintain a claim under section 1002 because he fails to assert
that Defendant violated UCO 1996-20 and fails to seek a remedy of enforcement against
Defendant to follow its adoption of UCO 1996-20 as required under section 1002. Therefore, as
the case authorities suggest, if Plaintiff challenges a land use decision under section 1001, he is
required to have standing to challenge the ordinance.
Plaintiff asserts that he has standing because he owns property that abuts the platted
Naples and Dupont streets through Columbia Avenue. Defendant contends, however, that
Plaintiff lacks standing because his property fails to actually and legally abut the vacated streets
of Naples and Dupont. Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court of Utah requires abutting
properties to obtain standing by stating, "Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge a street
vacation because their lots did not abut the vacated streets." Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359,
1362. Plaintiff contends his property abuts Naples and Dupont streets because each street
intersects Columbia Avenue on its west side and such streets continue through Columbia to abut
his property on the east side. Defendant disagrees with this argument and asserts that Columbia
Avenue is a collector street that serves the function to accept traffic from the access streets of
Dupont and Naples and distribute the traffic into the street circulation system. The Court is
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persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of Defendant's authorities the Court
concludes that Dupont and Naples streets merely connect into Columbia Avenue. The streets of
Dupont and Naples end at Columbia Avenue and do not cross through Columbia to abut
Plaintiffs property. Plaintiffs property, therefore, fails to abut any vacated street within the
Ironton Plat, and, as such, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge UCO 1996-20.
Notwithstanding a lack of standing, for purposes of making a record decision of each of
the issues the Court will next examine whether UCO 1996-20 is arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
The parties are in disagreement of whether UCO 1996-20's vacation of Walnut, Naples and
Dupont streets was a legislative or administrative act. Both parties agree that if the vacation of
streets is a legislative act then it would be viewed deferentially by the courts under the reasonable
debatable standard. However, it is Plaintiffs assertion that the act of vacation is administrative
in nature; and, therefore, should be reviewed utilizing substantial evidence to support the
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the case authorities
cited by Defendant are not unanimous; that the case of Bradley v Payson City Corp., 17 P.3d
1160 (Utah Ct. App. 2001,), regarding the existence of a difference in standards of review for
legislative and administrative acts, has been granted writ of certiorari of review by the Utah
Supreme Court; and the County Enabling Act designates plat vacation as a administrative act.
The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs first and second arguments. While the Court recognizes
there is a split of opinion of the appellate decision, it must nonetheless accept the authority for its
present application to the case.

7

The Court will next examine the Defendant's authorities to determine whether the
vacating of an ordinance is a legislative or administrative act. Defendant asserts that the
Supreme Court of Utah states that "the authority to vacate streets, when exercised in the general
public interest, is a legislative power vested in municipal corporations." Sears v. Ogden City,
572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). Plaintiff; however, asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-808 and 810
implicate that plat vacation is an administrative function that post-dates the Sears case
invalidating its authority. The Court concludes that § 808 and § 810 do not invalidate the Sears
case. The facts of the present case indicate that the Utah County Board of County
Commissioners, a legislative body, vacated the streets by legislative act, adopting UCO 1996-20.
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument that § 17-27-810 codifies the requirements that
are part of a legislative decision. U.C.A. § 17-27-810(l)(b) states,
If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither the public nor any person
will be materially injured by the proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and
that there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative
body, by ordinance, may vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat,
or any street or lot.
The Court notes the statute specifically states "the legislative body" and "by ordinance." The
statutory characterization of the body communicates that an ordinance vacating a plat is the
product of legislative action. Such action is a legislative action as further interpreted in Harmon
City, Inc, wherein the court stated, 'The legislative process is inherently political in nature and
requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interest of all concerned in furtherance of the
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general welfare." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d. 321 (Utah 2000). The Harmon
City case also states "it is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy,... and an
administrative body's job to enforce the policy." The Utah Court of Appeals concludes that "the
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act." Id. Further,
the Court of Appeals has stated, "unlike administrative proceedings which turn almost
exclusively on evidence presented, zoning decisions require municipalities to weigh competing
interests and conflicting concerns to arrive at a decision that serves the general welfare." Bradley
v. Payson City Corp., 17 P.2d. 1160 (Utah 2001).
After review of these authorities, the Court concludes that the vacation of streets in UCO
1996-20 is fundamentally a legislative act; and, therefore, is to be reviewed using the reasonably
debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal analysis of U.C.A. §
17-27-1001. As to the "reasonably debatable standard," the Court notes that the Utah Court of
Appeals has stated, "So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general
welfare ...the court will uphold the ... zoning decision." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997
P.2d 321 (Utah 2000). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was present at the Utah County
hearing held on October 29, 1996. Plaintiff voiced his concern over the proposed street vacation
because of his claim to an applicable reservation over Pine Street and Columbia Avenue, and as
such, the Commissioners, uncertain about Plaintiffs contention, determined to exclude Pine
Street and Columbia Avenue. The vacated streets were only dedicated streets. There existed no
physical nor historical general public use of any of the dedicated streets. The Court concludes
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that the public possessed no interest in the streets. The Utah County Commissioners also finding
that there was no public interest in the streets, concluded that it was beneficial to vacate the
streets. The Court concludes that there exists sufficient basis in the record to support the Board
of Utah County Commissioners, adopting of UCO 1996-20 with its vacating of Walnut, Naples,
and Dupont streets. As such, the Court does not find that the Utah County Commissioner's
action was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
Next, the Court examines Plaintiffs claim of violation of his right of due process.
Plaintiff asserts that his procedural and substantive rights of due process to access his property
have been violated with Defendant's adoption of UCO 1996-20. Plaintiff argues that his
property interests have been diminished with the vacated Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets
because he owns a reserved right-of-way conveyed to him by the R.L. Bird Company that
undeterminably runs over Pine Street to his property. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant's
actions have created questions of fact and violate its general police power. Defendant counters
however, that Plaintiffs argument impermissibly expands the scope of his claim. The Court
notes that Plaintiffs claim is based solely on UCO 1996-20, and also that the vacating ordinance
did not include Pine Street and Columbia Avenue. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's
arguments. Plaintiff has based his § 1983 claim upon UCO 1996-20. The UCO 1996-20 vacated
Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets but did not include Columbia Avenue and Pine Street, for
reasons previously stated. The Court concludes that while Plaintiff challenges UCO 1996-20, it
did not include Pine Street, and as such, Plaintiffs alleged reservation is irrelevant to this claim.
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Further, the Court has previously discussed the issue of Plaintiff s property allegedly abutting
Naples and Dupont Streets across Columbia Avenue and determined that Plaintiffs property
does not abut those streets. The Court also notes that Plaintiff cites a United States Supreme
Court decision which states, "land use ordinances that do not substantially advance a legitimate
public interest constitutes a denial of due process." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526
U.S. 687 (1998). Further, Plaintiff asserts that in not paying for its actions, Defendant has
surpassed the scope of its police powers. However, after review of Plaintiff s authorities, the
Court concludes that the cited cases refer to separate and distinct land use "takings" that Plaintiff
has not raised in his Complaint and Plaintiff cannot raise new claims or theories of recovery
through his Memorandum in Opposition. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that UCO 1996-20 had no rational relationship to Defendant's legitimate police
power objectives. Plaintiff cannot identify a protectible property interest or controvert
Defendant's evidence that it complied with the procedural requirements for passing UCO
1996-20. Plaintiffs claims for due process fail and there exists no issue of material fact
regarding the § 1983 claim.
Next, the Court will examine the validity of the Plaintiffs alleged easement reservation.
Plaintiff asserts that the reservation deeded to him by the R.L. Bird Company in 1995 is a valid
easement and one that may be precisely fixed by the Court. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs
reservation is void because Pine Street was not physically established as a public road; because
the Court is without authority to fix the location of the easement without physical markings and
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use; and because the description of the reservation is vague and violative of the statute of frauds.
Citing the Supreme Court of Utah, "it is manifest," however, "that a grantee may receive only
what the grantor has to give" Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952); Defendant argues that
R.L. Bird Company did not have a private easement in Pine Street and could not reserve or
convey what it did not own. Plaintiff counters that R.L. Bird Company originally owned all of
the adjacent property and owned the easement rights over Pine Street as an abutting property
owner when it reserved the right-of-way in 1983. It is undisputed by the parties that presently
Pine Street remains only a dedicated plat street. However, the Supreme Court of Utah has
established that private easements over public ways are created only when those public ways
physically existed at the time the landowner acquired the property. Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d
1112 (Utah 2001). Defendant's additional authorities support this establishment; and, therefore,
Pine Street though it exists on paper as a dedicated street, it has no physical existence or
historical use. Plaintiff, therefore, does not own a private easement over a public right-of-way.
Regardless of the public/private distinction discussed above, there is the added problem
in this case of determining the actual location of the alleged, reserved easement. Plaintiff
contends that the Court possesses the authority to fix the location of the easement. Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff misinterprets the case authorities because in each cited case there was some
physical improvement or fixture from which the easement could be associated. While the Court
is persuaded by Plaintiffs authorities which suggest the Court is generally empowered to
designate an easement location in some instances, the Court concludes that these authorities are
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distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Wood v Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952),
the parties constructed a fence and gate allowing use of the property between the servient and
dominant parcels. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded in that case, that because there was an
existing fence and gate, the trial court was adequately assisted to reasonably locate the easement
consistent with an existing physical improvement. Id. Further, in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E.
Walker Inc., 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), the location of the right-of-way was fixed because there
existed a conduit to transport water and the only question remaining for the court was to decide
the appropriate width of the easement. Having reviewed the parties' authorities, the Court
concludes that this case is distinguishable because there exists no physical improvement, fixture,
or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago.
Therefore, the Court is unable to discern from the deed a location for an easement and cannot
reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the easement by virtue of existing
fixtures.
Defendant also asserts that beyond the lack of specificity of the place of fixation for the
easement, the reservation as a whole is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. Defendant
cites the cases of Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P. 2d 533 (Utah 1999), and Southland Corp. v. Potter,
760 P.2d 320 (Utah 1988), in which the trial courts determined that the documents the parties
relied upon to reserve a right-of-way failed to establish the existence of an agreement needed to
create an express easement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reliance upon these authorities is
misfounded because each contained a stranger to the deed requiring the courts to ultimately
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decide the cases. Defendant asserts however, that while the cases discussed the issue of a
stranger to the deed, the courts nonetheless determined that the reservations were void because of
vagueness. The Court has reviewed Defendant's authorities and finds the argument persuasive.
Each case analyzes the issue of a possible express reservation and concludes that there was no
such reservation because of vagueness. In each case the stranger to the deed issue was treated
separately and distinctly in the discussion.
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim for his
breach of contract cause of action and his declaratory judgment claim is redundant. Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff must file a notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiff asserts that his previous counsel filed the notice of claim three months after he filed his
Amended Complaint. Defendant contends that, "No suit against the state may be maintained if
notice is not given." Madsen v. Bortnick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); and as such, Plaintiffs
filing the notice of claim three months after his filing of the Amended Complaint is untimely and
fails to provide proper notice. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. The Court
concludes that notice given after the Complaint or Amended Complaint is untimely, and,
therefore, the cause of action may not be maintained because of a lack of notice of a claim
against Utah County. Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff conceded his breach of contract
claim as untimely under the statute of limitations. Therefore, Plaintiff only has the remaining
prayer for relief for $50,000 in damages in regard to his § 1983 due process claim. The Court
has previously discussed Plaintiffs § 1983 claim and it is to be dismissed. Plaintiff also raises a
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new claim for inverse condemnation in his Memorandum in Opposition and not in his Amended
Complaint. The Court however, has previously concluded Plaintiffs new claim for inverse
condemnation as improperly pled; and, therefore, is to be dismissed. Further, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for declaratory judgment requesting the Court
declare his first four claims valid is redundant and as such, it is to be dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this
decision, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determines
that there exists no issue of material fact; and, therefore, respectfully dismisses all of Plaintiff s
claims for relief.
WHEREFORE, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and
Plaintiffs suit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATED this 3 1

day of July, 2002.

BY THE COURT:

IS/ FRED D. HOWARD
Judge Fred D. Howard
Utah Fourth District Court, Utah County
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMffi EVANS,

RULING Re: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No. 960400821

THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH COUNTY,

Honorable Fred D. Howard
District Court Judge

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter having come before the court on the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment; and the court having reviewed the Motion and Opposition; and the court being
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now makes the following ruling:
BACKGROUND
The matter before the Court concerns real property known as the Ironton Plat and
Ordinance 1996-20 affecting such plat which the Board of Utah County Commissioners adopted.
Ordinance 1996-20 vacated certain streets of the plat and Plaintiffs purported ownership of a
privateright-of-wayover the property. In February 1926, Knight Investment Company recorded
the Ironton Plat and dedicated for public use Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Walnut, Naples, Dupont
and Pine streets. In 1935 Utah County and the Colorado Development Company conveyed land
each owned near or within the Ironton Plat to the State of Utah to be included in the development
of the newly aligned Highway 89 between Provo City to the north and Springville City to the
1
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south. Subsequently, On July 9, 1983, the RX. Bird Company delivered a quit claim deed to
Utah County that conveyed lots it owned within the Ironton Plat to accommodate the County's
construction of a public works buildiag and a strip of land on the south boundary of the plat. This
quit claim deed contained a reservation which is the subject of Plaintiffs Motion that states:
RESERVING to the grantor the public use andright-of-wayover and
into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56* wide right-of-way
over and across the last described parcel of land,fromPine Street
to connect with grantor's remaining property over which Utah County
agrees to build a good gravel road within 90 days of the date of this
instrument, to provide access to grantor's remaining land.

On November 27, 1995, R.L. Bird Company conveyed another portion of its property
located to the south and east of the Ironton Plat to Jamie Evans and Terry Evans (hereinafter
"Plaintiff"). In January 1986, the County completed the construction of a public works facility
that included a building, a service station, and a parking lot within the Ironton Plat. During
construction a substantial amount of material was removed from the hillside located on the west
end of the Pine Street right-of-way. On October 29, 1996, the Board of Utah County
Commissioners (hereinafter "Defendant") adopted Ordinance 1996-20 (hereinafter "UCO 199620"), that vacated the platted Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets. The vacating ordinance UCO
1996-20 as adopted did not vacate platted Yale and Pine Streets or Columbia Avenue.
Seeking to challenge the vacating ordinance Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on
February 7, 1997. Defendant filed its Answer on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, on November 21,
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2001, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment to which Plaintiff filed his Opposition on
April 2, 2002, and which was followed by Defendant's Reply on May 8, 2002. Subsequently, the
Court heard oral argument on the Motion on May 14, 2002 and took the Motion under
advisement.
ANALYSIS
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a judgment shall be rendered
upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact/' Defendant asserts that there is no
genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiffs causes of action are barred under the law. By its
Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the ordinance; and
notwithstanding a lack of standing, the ordinance is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under
U.C.A. 17-27-1001; that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because there is no violation of Plaintiff s
right to due process; that Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations; that Plaintiffs reservation of aright-a-wayis void; that Plaintiff failed to file a notice
of claim with the County; and Plaintiffs request for Declaratory Judgment is a redundant cause of
action. Plaintiff denies that Defendant's assertions are a valid bar of his causes of action, but
concedes that his third cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the statute of
limitations. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs wife Mrs. Terry Evans must be added to the
lawsuit because the quit-claim deeds of 1995 and 2001 both contain her name, and, therefore, she
is an indispensable party. As communicated at oral argument, the Court notes that Mrs. Evans'
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name does appear on the deeds, and ais such the Court would grant Plaintiflf s request for leave to
join her as a Plaintiflf. Her joinder therefore is not material for the outcome of this Ruling.
The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiflf* s claim requesting the Court declare Utah
County Ordinance 1996-20 void pursuant to Utah Code § 17-27-1001, as an arbitrary and
capricious action. Defendant asserts that Plaintiflf lacks standing to bring this claim under U.C.A.
§ 17-27-1001. Plaintiflf, however, contends that his action can be brought under either under
U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 or U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 which does not require standing to enforce a
claim. U.C.A. § 17-27-1001, states in part:
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land
use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation
made under authority of this chapter until that person has
exhausted all administrative remedies.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days
after the local decision is rendered....
(3) (a) The Court shall:
(I) presume that land use decisions and regulations are
valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal,
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination
that the decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law.
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002, states in pertinent part:
(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate
within the county in which violations of this chapter or
ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter occur
or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies
4

provided by law, institute:
(I) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other
appropriate actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove
the unlawful building, use, or act

Plaintiff asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 only requires a person own property within the
county. Further, Plaintiff contends that he also has standing to satisfy section 1001 because his
property abuts the subject Naples, Dupont and Pine streets. Defendant, however, asserts that
Plaintiffs arguments fail because he initially brought his action under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 not
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002; that he is challenging the county's land use decision rather than seeking to
enforce provisions of the Land Use Act or the ordinance that the county enacted under its
authority; and he has failed to allege facts that would trigger the application of U.C.A. § 17-271002. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between section 1001 and section 1002
as:
Section 1001 applies only when a party desires to challenge
a land use decision. Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions
made under the Land Use Act, but instead seek enforcement
of decisions made pursuant to it... Enforcement of the act
and ordinances made pursuant to it is addressed in 1002...

Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 437 Utah Adv. Rep.
3 (Utah 2001).
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of the presented
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authorities the Court concludes that Plaintiffs claim is contained within section 1001. The Court
notes, however, Plaintiff fails to maintain a claim under section 1002 because he fails to assert that
Defendant violated UCO 1996-20 and fails to seek a remedy of enforcement against Defendant to
follow its adoption of UCO 1996-20 as required under section 1002. Therefore, as the case
authorities suggest, if Plaintiff challenges a land use decision under section 1001, he is required to
have standing to challenge the ordinance.
Plaintiff asserts that he has standing because he owns property that abuts the platted
Naples and Dupont streets through Columbia Avenue. Defendant contends, however, that
Plaintiff lacks standing because his property fails to actually and legally abut the vacated streets of
Naples and Dupont. Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court of Utah requires abutting
properties to obtain standing by stating, "Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge a street vacation
because their lots did not abut the vacated streets." Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362.
Plaintiff contends his property abuts Naples and Dupont streets because each street intersects
Columbia Avenue on its west side and such streets continue through Columbia to abut his
property on the east side. Defendant disagrees with this argument and asserts that Columbia
Avenue is a collector street that serves the function to accept traffic from the access streets of
Dupont and Naples and distribute the traffic into the street circulation system. The Court is
persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of Defendant's authorities the Court concludes
that Dupont and Naples streets merely connect into Columbia Avenue. The streets of Dupont and
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Naples end at Columbia Avenue and do not cross through Columbia to abut Plaintiffs property.
Plaintiffs property, therefore, fails to abut any vacated street within the Ironton Plat, and, as such,
Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge UCO 1996-20.
Notwithstanding a lack of standing, for purposes of making a record decision of each of
the issues the Court will next examine whether UCO 1996-20 is arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
The parties are in disagreement of whether UCO 1996-20fs vacation of Walnut, Naples and
Dupont streets was a legislative or administrative act. Both parties agree that if the vacation of
streets is a legislative act then it would be viewed deferentially by the courts under the reasonable
debatable standard. However, it is Plaintiffs assertion that the act of vacation is administrative in
nature; and, therefore, should be reviewed utilizing substantial evidence to support the arbitrary,
capricious and illegal standard. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the case authorities cited by
Defendant are not unanimous; that the case of Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 17 P.3d 1160 (Utah
Ct App. 2001), regarding the existence of a difference in standards of review for legislative and
administrative acts, has been granted writ ofcertiori of review by the Utah Supreme Court; and
the County Enabling Act designates plat vacation as a administrative act. The Court is
unpersuaded by Plaintiffs first and second arguments. While the Court recognizes there is a split
of opinion of the appellate decision, it must nonetheless accept the authority for its present
application to the case.
The Court will next examine the Defendant's authorities to determine whether the
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vacating of an vacation ordinance is a legislative or administrative act. Defendant asserts that the
Supreme Court of Utah states that "the authority to vacate streets, when exercised in the general
public interest, is a legislative power vested in municipal corporations." Sears v. Ogden City, 572
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). Plaintiff; however, asserts that UCA § 17-27-808 and 810 implicate that
plat vacation is an administrative function that post-dates the Sears case invalidating its authority.
The Court concludes that § 808 and § 810 do not invalidate the Sears case. The facts of the
present case indicate that the Utah County Board of County Commissioners, a legislative body,
vacated the streets by legislative act, adopting UCO 1996-20. The Court is persuaded by
Defendant's argument that § 17-27-810 codifies the requirements that are part of a legislative
decision. UCA § 17-27-810 (l)(b) states,
If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that
there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or
amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may vacate,
alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot.
The Court notes the statute specifically states "the legislative body" and "by ordinance." The
statutory characterization of the body communicates that an ordinance vacating a plat is the
product of legislative action. Such action is a legislative action as further interpreted in Harmon
City, Inc., wherein Plaintiff stated, "The legislative process is inherently political in nature and
requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interest of all concerned in furtherance of the
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general welfare." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P2d. 321 (Utah 2000). The Harmon
City case also states "it is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy,... and an
administrative body's job to enforce the policy." The Utah Court of Appeals concludes that "the
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act." Id. Further,
the Court of Appeals has stated, "unlike administrative proceedings which turn almost exclusively
on evidence presented, zoning decisions require municipalities to weigh competing interests and
conflicting concerns to arrive at a decision that serves the general welfare." Bradley v. Payson
City Corp., 17 P3d. 1160 (Utah 2001).
After review of these authorities, the Court concludes that the vacation of streets in UCO
1996-20 is fundamentally a legislative act; and, therefore, is to be reviewed using the reasonably
debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal analysis of UCA §17-27-1001.
As to the "reasonably debatable standard," the Court notes that the Utah Court of Appeals has
stated, "So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare... the
court will uphold the...zoning decision." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Utah
2000). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was present at the Utah County hearing held on
October 29, 1996. Plaintiff* voiced his concern over the proposed street vacation because of his
claim to an applicable reservation over Pine Street and Columbia Avenue, and as such, the
Commissioners, uncertain about Plaintiff's contention, determined to exclude Pine Street and
Columbia Avenue. The vacated streets were only dedicated streets. There existed no physical
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nor historical general public use of any of the dedicated streets. The Court concludes that the
public possessed no interest in the streets. The Utah County Commissioners alsofindingthat
there was no public interest in the streets, concluded that it was beneficial to vacate the streets.
The Court concludes that there exists sufficient basis in the record to support the Board of Utah
County Commissioners, adopting of UCO 1996-20 with its vacating of Walnut, Naples, and
Dupont streets. As such, the Court does notfindthat the Utah County Commissioner's action
was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
Next, the Court examines Plaintiffs claim of violation of hisrightof due process. Plaintiff
asserts that his procedural and substantive rights of due process to access his property have been
violated with Defendant's adoption of UCO 1996-20. Plaintiff argues that his property interests
have been diminished with the vacated Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets because he owns a
reservedright-of-wayconveyed to him by the R.L. Bird Company that undeterminably runs over
Pine Street to his property. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant's actions have created
questions of fact and violate its general police power. Defendant counters however, that
Plaintiffs argument impermissibly expands the scope of his claim. The Court notes that Plaintiffs
claim is based solely on UCO 1996-20, and also that the vacating ordinance did not include Pine
Street and Columbia Avenue. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's arguments. Plaintiff has
based his § 1983 claim upon UCO 1996-20. The UCO 1996-20 vacated Walnut, Naples and
Dupont streets but did not include Columbia Avenue and Pine Street, for reasons previously
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stated. The Court concludes that while Plaintiff challenges UCO 1996-20, it did not include Pine
Street, as such, Plaintiffs alleged reservation is irrelevant to this claim. Further, the Court has
previously discussed the issue of Plaintiff s property allegedly abutting Naples and Dupont Streets
across Columbia Avenue and determined that Plaintiffs property does not abut those streets. The
Court also notes that Plaintiff cites a United States Supreme Court decision which states, "land
use ordinances that do not substantially advance a legitimate public interest constitutes a denial of
due process." City ofMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1998). Further, Plaintiff
asserts that in not paying for its actions, Defendant has surpassed the scope of its police powers.
However, after review of Plaintiff s authorities, the Court concludes that the cited cases refer to
separate and distinct land use "takings" that Plaintiff has not raised in his Complaint and Plaintiff
cannot raise new claims or theories of recovery through his Memorandum in Opposition.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that UCO 1996-20 had no
rational relationship to Defendant's legitimate police power objectives. Plaintiff cannot identify a
protectible property interest or controvert Defendant's evidence that it complied with the
procedural requirements for passing UCO 1996-20. Plaintiffs claims for due process fail and
there exists no issue of material fact regarding the § 1983 claim.
Next, the Court will examine the validity of the Plaintiffs alleged easement reservation.
Plaintiff asserts that the reservation deeded to him by the R.L. Bird Company in 1995 is a valid
easement and one that may be precisely fixed by the Court. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs
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reservation is void because Pine Street was not physically established as a public road; because the
Court is without authority to fix the location of the easement without physical markings and use;
and because the description of the reservation is vague and violative of the statute of frauds.
Citing the Supreme Court of Utah, "It is manifest," however, "that a grantee may receive only
what the grantor has to give" Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952); Defendant argues that
RX. Bird Company did not have a private easement in Pine Street and could not reserve or
convey what it did not own. Plaintiff counters that RX. Bird Company originally owned all of the
adjacent property and owned the easement rights over Pine Street as an abutting property owner
when it reserved theright-of-wayin 1983. It is undisputed by the parties that presently Pine
Street remains only a dedicated plat street. However, the Supreme Court of Utah has established
that private easements over public ways are created only when those public ways physically
existed at the time the landowner acquired the property. Carrier v. Lindquist, 3 7 P . 3 d l l l 2
(Utah 2001). Defendant's additional authorities support this establishment; and, therefore, Pine
Street though it exists on paper as a dedicated street, it has no physical existence or historical use.
Plaintiff, therefore, does not own a private easement over a public right-of-way.
Regardless of the public/private distinction discussed above, there is the added problem in
this case of determining the actual location of the alleged, reserved easement. Plaintiff contends
that the Court possesses the authority to fix the location of the easement. Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff misinterprets the case authorities because in each cited case there was some physical
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improvement orfixturefromwhich the easement could be associated. While the Court is
persuaded by PlaintiflPs authorities which suggest the Court is generally empowered to designate
an easement location in some instances, the Court, concludes that these authorities are
distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Woodv. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952),
the parties constructed a fence and gate allowing use of the property between the servient and
dominant parcels. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded in that case, that because there was an
existing fence and gate, the trial court was adequately assisted to reasonably locate the easement
consistent with an existing physical improvement. Id. Further, in Salt Lake City v. J.B. &RE.
Walker Inc., 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), the location of theright-of-waywas fixed because there
existed a conduit to transport water and the only question remaining for the court was to decide
the appropriate width of the easement. Having reviewed the parties' authorities, the Court
concludes that this case is distinguishable because there exists no physical improvement, fixture,
or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago.
Therefore, the Court is unable to discernfromthe deed a location for an easement and cannot
reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the easement by virtue of existing fixtures
Defendant also asserts that beyond the lack of specificity of the place offixationfor the
easement, the reservation as a whole is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. Defendant
cites the cases of Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah 1999), and Southland Corp. v. Potter,
760 P.2d 320 (Utah 1988), which the trial courts determined that the documents the parties relied
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upon to reserve aright-of-wayfailed to establish the existence of an agreement needed to create
an express easement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reliance upon these authorities is
misfounded because each contained a stranger to the deed requiring the courts to ultimately
decide the cases. Defendant asserts however, that while the cases discussed the issue of a
stranger to the deed, the courts nonetheless determined that the reservations were void because of
vagueness. The Court has reviewed Defendant's authorities andfindsthe argument persuasive.
Each case analyzes the issue of a possible express reservation and concludes that there was no
such reservation because of vagueness. In each case the stranger to the deed issue was treated
separately and distinctly in the discussion.
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim for his breach
of contract cause of action and his declaratory judgment claim is redundant. Defendant asserts
that Plaintiff must file a notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity's Act. Plaintiff
asserts that his previous counsel filed the notice of claim three months after he filed his Amended
Complaint. Defendant contends that, "No suit against the state may be maintained if notice is not
given." Madsen v. Bortnick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); and as such, Plaintiffs filing the notice of
claim three months after hisfilingof the Amended Complaint is untimely and fails to provide
proper notice. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. The Court concludes that notice
given after the Complaint or Amended Complaint is untimely, and, therefore, the cause of action
may not be maintained because of a lack of notice of a claim against Utah County. Further, the
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Court notes that Plaintiff conceded his breach of contract claim as untimely under the statute of
limitations. Therefore, Plaintiff only has the remaining prayer for relief for $50,000 in damages in
regard to his § 1983 due process claim. The Court has previously discussed Plaintiff's § 1983
claim and is to be dismissed. Plaintiff also raises a new claim for inverse condemnation in his
Memorandum in Opposition and not in his Amended Complaint. The Court however, has
previously concluded Plaintiffs new claim for inverse condemnation as improperly pled; and,
therefore, is to be dismissed. Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action
for declaratory judgment requesting the Court declare hisfirstfour claims valid is redundant and
as such, it is to be dismissed.
For the forgoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this
decision, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determines
that there exists no issue of material fact; and, therefore, respectfully dismisses all of Plaintiffs
claims for relief Defendant's counsel is directed to submit an Order to the Court consistent with
this Decision.
DATED this / f ^ d a v of July, 2002.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that true copies of the foregoing ruling were mail, postage prepaid, on the
July 2002 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit:

I

day of

Craig W. Wentz
Barton H. Kunz II
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, PC.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Samuel D. McVey
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0210

Deputy Court Clerk
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jUtah County Enginp^jr
jUtah County Builc

QUIT-CLAIM DEED

R. L. BIRD COMPANY, a corporation organized a-d existing under the laws
of the State of Utah with its principal office at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to UTAH COUNTY, State of
Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable
consideration, the following tracts of land in Utah County, State of Utah ;

*»5."

All of lots 13, 14, 17, and IS in Block 6 of the Ironton Subdivision
Plat A.
loft*' A 1 1 of lotg n ^ 12, 19, 20 and 21 and the fractional parts of lots
13, Iky 15, 16, 17, and 18 belonging to the grantor in Block 7 of the Ironton
Subdivision Plat A.
ALSO; Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Ironton Subdivision
/^gflat A, which point is at the east end of the south line of Pine Street,
running thence South 32 Deg. 52. Min East 120 feet; thence South 57 Deg.
08 Min, West 760 feet to State Highway; thence North 32 Deg. 52 Min. West
along said highway 120 feet to South line of Pine Street; thence North
57 Deg. 08 Min. East 760 feet to point of beginning.
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and
into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide right-of-way
over and across the last described parcel of land, from Pine Street to
connect with the grantor's remaining property over which Utah County agrees
to build a good gravel road within 90 days of the date of this in-strumeh^,
to provide access to grantor's remaining land.
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the
i| transfer represented thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly
{
| adopted by the board of directors of the grantor at a lawful meeting duly
ij held and attended by a quorum.
|
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and
I seal to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers this ?J?L day
, of July A.D. 1983.
R. L. BIRD COMPANY

Attest:
Secretary
,tl ^<

By

«Oa-x-<rcA^. -a. iu*x
„_ President
7- >

°P

% V ' ^ T A T E OF UTAH
Vfeota^ty of Salt Lake )
On the ?— day of July, A.D. 1983 personally appeared before me
Dorothy B. Hart and M. A. Bird who being by me duly sworn did say, each
for himself, that she the said Dorothy B. Hart is the president,and he.
the said M. >„ Bird is the secretary of the R. L. Bird Company, and that
the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation
• by authorijty of a resolution of its board of directors and said Dorothy B.
Hart and M. A. Bird each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation
1
executed the same and t hat the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.

?0
Notary Public
•P, D lMjrCcommision expires October 28, 1985

Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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Knew a l l m«tn by th so p r e s e n t s tftat the kNtGHT IKVEST
KENT COMPANY a c o r p o r a t i o n owner or th« above d e s c r i b e d land
h a v t o f c a u s e d t h e sa»»« t o be s u b d i v i d e d i n t o BlocKs Lota S t r e e t s
and Ar«nuea t o be h e r e a f t e r Kntr«n aa 1R0HTON S u b d U i a i o n Acme
Hereby d e d i c a t e f o r t h e p t r w i t u a l y a a of t h o P u b l i c a l l p a r c e l *
o f land d e s i g n a t e d In the Surveyor 3 C e r t i f i c a t e and shewn on
t h t a map a« i n t e n d e d f o r P u b l i c u s e s
IN WlTUrSS WHEBEOr the »nid MIGHT INVESTMENT COMPAWT
haa boreunto c a u s e d i t s c o r w r o t e naine t o b e s i g n e d and H a c o r p o r a t e s e a l t o be a f f i x e d , ind the 30*c t o be a t t e s t e d by t h e
s i g n a t u r e of j m
Knight i t s **ice P r e s i d e n t and P. K A l l e n
i t s S e c r a i a r y en t b i s i & d a . o r XarcO A D 1923
This asree
went 13 e x e c u t e d by a n i d coitpany and by s a i d o f f i c e r s by v i r t u e
o f & r e s o l u t i o n duly p a s s e d by I t ] d i r e c t o r s en t h e a U day o r
Waecft A D 1 0 2 3
The BH1CHT INVESTMENT COMPANY

coumr suKVEroR s

tRtincATE

ISO OO FT

OUNTJ^-^RVCYOH

itsseereta^

^ 3

t e p o i n t of T»e»innin«
ACKHOWUEDCE»E?r BEFORE «0TAfTf PU8HC

That I have b j the a u t h o r i t y of s a i d owners t h e r e o f aub
d i v i d e d t h e same i n t o b l o c k s l o t a s t r e e t s and avenue* to bo
known a s IHDMTOW S u b d i v i s i o n t h a t the aa»« ha* been c o r r e c t l y
s u r v e y e d end e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e ground by the p l a c i n g ef i r o n
y i n s irte f e e t l o n g by 5 / a I n c h e s i n d l a n t t e r at the block c o r n e r s
HAWE3 AND D1MEJI310HS OF FARCEW OF 1A*ID PE31CWATED FOP. PUBLIC U3E
COLUMBIA AVE«UE 8 0 f t wide l a 2372 f t long KENWOOD ST 1 6 f t wide
15 520 f t long HAWARt> ST 60 f t w i d e IS 615 f t
long YALE ST
60 rt wide l a 666 Tt l o n g HUHCETOH ST 60 f t wide i a 560 f t long
WALNUT ST 6 0 f t wide ia 560 f t long WAPLS5 ST 60 f t wide ia 560
ft
lotiar DOPOMT 3T 60 f t wide 13 560 f t long PIH£ 3T 6 0 f t
da
16 B50 f t
long

4iS3i~

.,

County of

Utah

0r> tho iJ» day o f Ma ch A D 1923 p e r s o n a U y appeared
b e f o r e me 3 Vm Knight whi beirij by m%. duly a*orn d i d say t h a t
he i s t.he V i c e P r e s i d e n t of t h e Knight i m c a t i a e n t CanpatV a e o r p
o r a t i o n o r g a n i s e d and e x i a t ng under t h e lawa o f t h e s t a t e of Utah
t h a t s a i d I n a t r u n e n t was a n ncd i n b e h a l f o f s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n by
t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a r e s o l u t i . 1 o f i t s board o f d i r e c t o r s , e n a c t e d
on t h e *«• day o f March A D 19Z3 and t h e s a i d J Km Knight
sctnowledged to ne that sal corporation executed t h i s inetrunent
Hy c wlssior
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